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CARVING A NEW PATH TO EQUITY
CAPITAL AND SHARE LIQUIDITY
WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR. *
Abstract: This Article advocates regulatory reforms designed to carve a
new path to equity capital and share liquidity for private companies. Spe-
cifically, the reforms would allow private companies to seek sophisticated
investors through general solicitation and would foster the development
of a liquid "sophisticated-investors only" ("SIO") market for private com-
pany shares. The reforms are grounded in the fundamental principle of
U.S. securities laws that sophisticated investors can lend for themselves"
and therefore require considerably fewer legal safeguards. As a result, the
reforms would enhance capital formation by reducing regulatory bur-
dens without compromising investor protection. The Article details the
reforms and explains how they can be implemented under existing fed-
eral securities laws. It then considers the possibilities for new SIO markets
if the reforms are adopted and theorizes about how the resulting securi-
ties regulatory void for SIO companies would be tilled.
a
	 INTRODUCTION
Many companies, especially emerging companies, depend on eq-
uity capital to finance their businesses.' Traditionally, an emerging
company raises equity capital through the sale of stock to angel inves-
tors and venture capitalists. 2 It uses this funding to develop and com-
mercialize a business concept, at which point it goes public through an
initial public offering ("11)0"). 3 Going public allows the company to
raise. a substantial amount of additional equity capital that it can use to
ramp up production, sales, and marketing. It also allows the company
* Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law,Northern Kentucky University.
J.D., University of Notre Dame; B.S., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. I would
like to thank participants at faculty workshops at University of Arizona James E. Rogers
College of Law and University of Maryland School of Law for their helpful comments on
earlier versions of this Article.
II U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SMALL BUSINESS: EIEFORTS 	 FACILrIATE EQUITY
CAPITAL FORMATION 1 (2000) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/
archive/ 2000/gg-00190.pdf.
2 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It's Time to Allow General Solicitation and
Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1,5-7 (2004).
3 See id.
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to attain share liquidity because its shares are traded on a public market
following an IPO.
As things stand today, the problem with the traditional route is that
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") 4 has made it
much more expensive to be a public company. As a result, a number of
private companies have pursued alternative paths to equity capital and
share liquidity. 5 Although these alternative paths work to some extent,
they have significant drawbacks and, therefore, are unsuitable for many
private companies. Consequently, this Article advocates regulatory re-
forms designed to carve a new path to equity capital and share liquid-
ity. 6 Specifically, the reforms would allow private companies to seek so-
phisticated investors through general solicitation and would foster the
development of a liquid "sophisticated-investors only" ("SIO") market
for private company shares. The reforms are grounded in the funda-
mental principle of U.S. securities laws that sophisticated investors can
"fend for themselves" and, therefore, require considerably fewer legal
safeguards.? As a result, the reforms would enhance capital formation
by reducing regulatory burdens without compromising investor protec-
tion. 8
Part I of this Article sets the stage by discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of going public versus remaining private. 9 Part II delves
into the need for a new path to equity capital and share liquidity by dis-
cussing how SOX has escalated the costs of being public and exploring
the shortcomings of alternatives to going public. 10 Part III details pro-
posed reforms and describes how they can be implemented under ex-
isting federal securities laws." Part. IV considers the possibilities for new
SlO markets if these reforms are implemented and theorizes about how
the resulting securities regulatory void for SIO companies would be
filled."
4 SarballeS-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15,18, and 28 U.S.C.).
5 See infra notes 169-194 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 195-276 and accompanying text.
7 Sec SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,125 (1953).
See id.
9 See infra notes 13-137 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 138-194 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 195-276 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 277-317 and accompanying text.
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I. GOING PUBLIC VERSUS REMAINING PRIVATE
A. Going Public
I. Advantages
A company typically starts off as private but for a variety of reasons
may later choose to go public, usually through an IP0. 13 Going public
offers a company a number of advantages, including enhanced reputa-
tion, establishment of a market value for the company, and a broad-
ened ownership base." For many companies, however, the primary ad-
vantages of going public are securing a large infusion of equity capital
and attaining share liquidity. 15
a. Capital Infitsion
Going public enables a company to raise a sizeable amount of eq-
uity capital. The size of the infusion ranges from several million to hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in cash, depending on the size of the offer-
ing. Additionally, going public likely makes it easier for the company to
raise capital going forward because it opens up new sources and meth-
ods of financing (for example, private investments in public equity
("PIPE") and shelf offerings). 16 Further, lenders are often more willing
to lend to a public company because they know, as discussed below, that
the company is required to make ongoing extensive public disclosures
about its financial results and business operations, and that such disclo-
sures will be scrutinized by investors, analysts, and regulators."
13 See James C. Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory
and Practice, 61 J. FIN. 399, 405-07 (2006).
14 See id.
16 See id. at 406 (noting that creating liquid stock for use in future acquisitions scored
the highest in a survey of CFOs concerning the importance of various factors in the deci-
sion to go public).
16 For an overview of PIPE financing, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Foreword, PIPES, 2
ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 381, 383-90 (2007).
17 See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership,
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. Ittv. 231, 257 (2008); William K.
Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public' Through an Internet Direct Public Offering: A Sensible Alternative for
Small Contpanies!, 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 574 (2001).
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b. Share Liquidity
Another advantage of going public is that it results in share liquid-
ity. 18 Shares are considered liquid if they can be easily converted into
cash. An IPO leads to share liquidity because, thereafter, the company's
shares will trade on a public market, typically the New York Stock Ex-
change ("NYSE") or the NASDAQ Stock Market. Companies value share
liquidity for a number of reasons. First, liquid stock can be used as cur-
rency for acquisitions. 19 This allows a public company to pursue an ac-
quisition even if it lacks sufficient cash or borrowing capacity. 2° Second,
a company can use liquid stock as a component of employee compensa-
tion. Liquid stock is attractive to employees because it can be easily val-
ued and converted into cash, and it provides tax benefits and upside
potential. These considerations aid in employee recruitment and retell-
tion 21 and better align the interests of employees and shareholders. 22
Third, fluctuations in the price of a company's stock in a liquid market '
aids management because it provides immediate feedback as to the
market consensus on the company's strategy and performance. 23
Company founders value share liquidity because it allows them to
easily diversify their portfolios. 24 Company founders typically have a
large portion of their wealth and human capital invested in the corn-
la See James C. Brau et al., The Choke of IPO Versus Takeover: Empirical Evidence, 76 J. Bus.
583, 590 (2003).
la See id.
20 See 11 SIMON M. LORNE & JOY M. BRYAN, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED
AND CONTESTED TRANSACTIONS § 3:4 (2008) (describing advantages of "tax-free" reorgani-
zation). Target companies are frequently willing to be acquired for stock because of tax
considerations. See id.
21 See Exemption of Compensatory Employee Stock Options from Registration Under
Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 56,010, 72
Fed. Reg. 37,608, 37,608 (proposed July 10, 2007) ("Compensatory employee stock op-
tions provide a method to use non-cash compensation to attract, retain, and motivate
company employees, directors, and consultants."); see also NASDAQ Inc., GOING PUBLIC: A
GUIDE FOR NORTH AMERICAN COMPANIES LISTING ON TIIE U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS 15
(Nicole	 Lew	 ed.,	 White	 Page	 LTD	 2005),	 available	 at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/listing_guide.
sun; Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL
Bus. L.J. 649, 663 (2008).
22 See Booth, supra note 21, at 663.
23 See Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 17, at 256 ("Mite informational efficiency of
public company share prices provides an important management tool—a company re-
ceives virtually instant feedback through prices and periodic feedback through analyst
reports, concerning its strategy and performance and that of its competitors ...."); see also
Vojislav Maksimovic & Pegaret Pichler, Technological Innovation and Initial Public Offerings, 14
REV. FIN. STUD. 459, 461 (2001).
24 See Booth, supra note 21, at 662.
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pany. 25 Once a public market is established for the company's shares,
founders can sell a portion of their holdings into the market, invest the
proceeds elsewhere, and thereby reduce portfolio risk without decreas-
ing expected returns. 26
Finally, early-stage investors value share liquidity because it allows
them to cash out or exit their investments. 27 Exit capability is particu-
larly important to venture capitalists because their business model of
providing short-term funding to start-up companies depends on it. 28
Exiting a company once it goes public allows a venture capitalist to re-
cycle into new ventures the financial and nonfinancial support it pro-
vided the company to get it to its IP0. 29
2. Disadvantages
The primary disadvantages of going public are that it triggers ex-
tensive disclosure obligations and that it subjects a company and its of-
ficers and directors to potential civil and criminal liability under federal
securities laws."
a. Extensive Regulation
To complete an f130, a company must register the offering under
the Securities Act. 3 i Registering involves preparing and filing a registra-
tion statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"). 32 Under SEC regulations, the registration statement must con-
tain detailed and voluminous disclosures about the issuer and the offer-
ing. 33 These disclosures include audited financial statements, compara-
tive selected financial information, and management's discussion and
analysis ("MD&A") of the issuer's financial condition and results of op-




27 See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, linture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47J. FIN. Econ. 243, 252 (1998).
28 See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 316
(2005).
29 See Black & Gilson, supra note 27, at 245-46. Nonfinancial support includes monitor-
ing and advisory services and repinational capital. See id. at 245.
81) See infra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
II See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3 (2006).
22 See id. § 77f.
" See id. §§ 77g, 77aa.
m See 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK §§ 6:24—:25, at 333-34
(2005).
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ness, properties, transactions with management, legal proceedings, and
executive compensation. 35
Once public, a company becomes subject to the reporting re-
quirements of the Exchange Act. 36 The Exchange Act requires public
companies to prepare and pile with the SEC annual, quarterly, and cur-
rent reports. 37 Annual reports must include a description of the com-
pany's business, risk factors, audited financial statements for the year,
Mll&A, and information concerning executive compensation. 38 Quar-
terly reports must include unaudited quarterly financial statements and
Mll&A with respect to quarterly results." A public company must file a
current report following the occurrence of certain specified events (for
example, entry into a material agreement outside the ordinary course
of business, resignation of the company's independent accountant, and
appointment or resignation of a principal officer).° The report must
include detailed information about the event.'"
Most public companies are also subject to federal proxy regula-
tions. 42 These regulations require a company to furnish its sharehold-
ers a proxy statement whenever it solicits proxies. 43 The proxy state-
ment is designed to provide shareholders with relevant information
with respect to the matters up for vote for which proxies are solicited."
For example, a proxy statement relating to the election of directors
must include biographical information about the nominees, when they
first became directors, and their stock and option holdings in the cor-
poration.° The proxy statement must also include detailed informa-
tion about director compensation and transactions between any direc-
tor and the corporation during the past year. 46 Additionally, if a proxy
35 See id.
36 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006).
37 See id. § 78m(a). The SEC adopted these requirements pursuant to § 13(a) of the
Exchange Act, which empowers the SEC to prescribe "information and documents" and
"annual reports" that it deems as necessary or appropriate for the proper protection of
investors and to insure fair dealing in the security." See id.
" See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Form 10-K, pt. I, at 7-9, available at http://www.
sec.gov/about/forms/forml0-k.pdf; see also 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2008).
39 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Form 10-Q, pt. I, at 5, available at http://www.sec.
gov/about/forms/forml0-q.pdf; see also 17 C.F.R. § 249.308(a).
40 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Form 8-K, § 1, at 4-6, §§ 4-5, at 13-18, available at '
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf; see also 17 C.F.R. § 249.308.
41 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Form 8-K §§ 1, 4-5, at 4, 13-18.
42 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2008).
43 See id.
44 See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LtIV § 9.2, at 366 (1986).
45 See Schedule 14A, Items 7-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101.
46 See id.; see also I BLOOMENThAL, supra note 34, § 17:6, at 969.
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solicitation for the election of directors at an annual meeting is made
by the corporation's management, the solicitation materials must be
accompanied or preceded by an annual report to security holders. 47 As
required by SEC regulations, the annual report provides detailed in-
formation about the corporation's performance, including audited
year-end financial statements.48 -
Compliance with the above regulations is costly because a public
company will incur legal and accounting fees and management oppor-
tunity costs year after year preparing the plethora of documents. 49
Compliance also costs the company a large degree of confidentiality. 5°
A company is required to disclose in its IPO registration statement
theretofore confidential information." Thereafter, the company is re-
quired to periodically update this information in various SEC filings, all
of which are freely accessible on the SEC's website. 52
 Further, a public
company is generally obligated to disclose material events to the mar-
ketplace as they occur." More significantly, the loss of confidentiality as
a result of mandatory disclosure requirements can result in lost com-
petitive advantage. A public company's competitors can learn much
more about the company's business plans, product development, and
perceived risks than they ever could about a private company. Addi-
tionally, the very fact that a' company has completed a successful IPO
can encourage new firms to enter the industry, thus increasing the
number of competitors. 54
b. Increased Liability Exposure
Another disadvantage of going public is that doing so subjects a
company and its officers and directors to potential civil and criminal
liability under various provisions of the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act. 55 Liability provisions under the Securities Act include Sec-
47 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b).
48
 See id.
49 See NASDAQ, Inc., supra note 21, at 16 ("Compliance with disclosure requirements
necessitates a comprehensive and costly expansion—or outright replacement—of existing
corporate information systems.").
51/ See 1 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 34, §§ 6:23-:29, at 332-34.
51 See id.
52 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Filings & Forms, http://www.sec.goviedgar.shtml  (last
visited Mar. 5, 2009).
55 See 2 151.00mENTHAL. suprdnote 34, § 27:27.
54 See Maksimovic & Pichler, supra note 23, at 460.
55 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(a) (2), 77q (a), 77x.
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tions 11, 56 12(a) (2), 57 17(a), 58 and 24. 59 Section 11 imposes civil liabil-
ity for misstatements or omissions of material fact from a registration
statement. 60 Potential Section 11 defendants include the issuer and its
executive officers, directors, underwriters, and accountants. 61 Likewise,
Section 12(a) (2) imposes civil liability on any person who offers or sells
a security through a prospectus or oral conummication that includes a
misstatement of material fact or omits to state a material fact. 62 Addi-
tionally, Section 17(a) makes it unlawful for any person to engage in
fraud or misstate a material fact or omit to state a material fact in the
offer or sale of a security.° Finally, Section 24 of the Securities Act im-
poses criminal liability for any willful violation of the Act. 64
Liability provisions under the Exchange Act include Rule 10b-5, 65
Rule 14a-9," and Section 32(a). 67 Rule 10b-5 imposes liability for mis-
statements of material fact, or misleading omissions of material fact, in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security." The dissemination
of Exchange Act reports is considered to be made "in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security" because it is presumed that the in-
formation in such reports is quickly incorporated into the market price
of a company's securities and that investors rely on the integrity of the
market price in deciding whether to purchase or sell such securities. 69
56 Id, § 77k.
57 Id. § 771(a) (2).
56 M.§ 77q(a).
59 Id. § 77x.
60 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
61 See id. § 77k (a).
62 Id. § 771(a)(2).
63 Id. § 77q (a).
64 Id.
€6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
66 Id. § 240.14a-9.
67 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
66 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). Rule 10b-5(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person „ . (b) [do make any untrue statement of
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity.
Id.
69 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) ("[T] he price of a company's
stock is determined by the available material information regarding the company and its
business.... Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the
purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements." (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d
1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986))); see also SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d
Cir. 1968) (noting that a material misstatement or omission is made "in connection with
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Hence, a company is potentially liable under Rule 10b-5 for any mate-
rial misstatements in or omissions from an Exchange Act report be-
cause the correct information it was obligated to disclose is not re-
flected in the market price." Directors and officers of the company are
potentially subject to controlling person or aiding and abetting liability
if the company is found to have violated Rule 10b-5. 71
Rule ,10b-5 is very broad in its reach. 72 It applies not just to Ex-
change Act reports but to any public statements made by a company by
whatever means (for example, press releases, interviews, and television
appearances)." This is because it is presumed that all material public
information about a company is impounded into its stock price. 74
Rule 14a-9 imposes liability for misstatements of material fact, or
misleading omissions of material fact, in connection with the solicita-
tion of proxies." Finally, Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act imposes
criminal liability for any willful violation of the Act."
Costs of this increased liability risk include director and officer li-
ability insurance premiums, and, of course, legal fees and diversion of
management time if a suit is threatened or filed, regardless of merit.
Costs may also include reduced risk taking by management to minimize
the chances of lawsuits and increased director and officer compensa-
tion as recompense for bearing this increased risk. 77
B. Staying Private
. 1. AdVantages
Staying private offers a company a number of advantages, including
more freedom to focus on long-term prospects and less public scrutiny.
The primary advantage of staying private, however, is avoiding the ex-
the purchase or sale of any security" if it "would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon,
and, in connection therewith, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's
securities").
7° See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
71 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t.
• 72 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
73 See 2 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 34, § 27:16, at 117 (noting that Rule 10b-5 imposes
liability and responsibility for false or misleading statements in connection with press
releases, letters, and reports to shareholders, and the like").
74 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42.
75 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9.
76 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (a).
77 See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RtesTtiN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT
WE'VE LEARNED; How TO FIX 1T 45-46 (2006).
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tensive federal regulation and increased liability exposure triggered by
going public. Most of the rules and regulations described above simply
do not apply to a private company." Specifically, Exchange Act report-
ing requirements apply only to a company with securities registered un-
der Section 12 of the Exchange Act" or a company that has filed a reg-
istration statement that has become effective under the Securities Act. 8°
A company is required to register securities under Section 12 only if (1)
it desires to list the securities on a "national securities exchange," (e.g.,
the NYSE or NASDAQ) or (2) it has $10 million or more in total assets
and a class of equity securities held of record by 500 or more persons. 81
Hence, a private company will simply refrain from filing a registration
statement tinder the Securities Act or listing securities on a "national
securities exchange" until it is ready to go public, and it will keep careful
track of the number of shareholders it has in order to avoid surpassing
the 499 threshold. 82 Similarly, SEC proxy regulations apply only to a
company with securities registered under Section 12 of the Exchange
Act. 83 As a result, a private company will not be required to file annual,
quarterly, or current reports or any proxy materials with the SEC. 84
Furthermore, there is much less liability risk for a private company
and its officers and directors. 85 Because a private company does not
prepare and file annual, quarterly, and current reports or proxy state-
ments, there are no such documents that a plaintiff can claim deficient
in a lawsuit. Moreover, because private companies do not have publicly
traded stock, there are no large one-day drops in stock price to trigger
class action lawsuits.
A private company, however, does face potential liability under Se-
curities Act Section 17 86 and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 87 as these provi-
sions apply to all sales of securities, whether by a public or private corn-
78 Sec. e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 784 780.
79 Id. § 78l.
8° Id. § 78°(d).
81 See id. § 781(g). Note that section 12(g)(1) provides for a total asset threshold of $1
million, but through Rule 12g-1 under the Exchange Act, the SEC has exempted a com-
pany from having to register under section 12(g) if its total assets do not exceed $10 mil-
lion. See 1 7 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1.
82 See 15 U.S.C. § 78/(g)(1)(13).
83 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (providing that proxy solicitation rules "apply to every so-
licitation of a proxy with respect to securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the [Ex-
change] Act").
84 See id. §§ 240.12g-1, 240.14a-2.
85 Sec id.
83 15 U.S.C. § 77q.
Ea 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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pany. 98 Thus, a private company could get sued under Section 17(a)
and Rule 1 Ob-5, if, for example, the offering memorandum it used to
sell securities in a private placement contained material errors or omis-
sions. 89 Section 17(a), however, does not include an express private
right of action, and numerous courts have ruled that none exists. 90 Fur-
ther, Rule 10b-5 does not cast the same specter of liability as, for exam-
ple, Section 11 under the Securities Act, because to prevail in a Rule
10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, scienter, reli-
ance, and causation, 91 none of which are elements of a Section 11
claim.92 And, again, a private company does not distribute the quar-
terly, annual, and current reports that often serve as the basis for Rule
1 Ob-5 lawsuits against public companies. 95
2. Disadvantages
The primary disadvantages of staying private are constraints on
capital raising and share illiquidity.
a. Constraints on. Raising Capital
Federal securities laws impose a variety of restraints on a private
company's ability to raise capital. These restraints stem from Section 5
of the Securities Act, which makes it unlawful for any person to offer
and sell a security unless the transaction is registered with the SEC. 94
Congress recognized, however, that it is inefficient to require the regis-
tration of all securities offerings and therefore included a number of
registration exemptions in the Securities Act. 95 As a result, if a private
company needs to raise capital through the sale of securities, it must do
so in compliance with an exemption from Section 5 to avoid triggering
reporting and other obligations under the Exchange Act. 96 Because an
exempt offering is, by definition, not registered with the SEC, and
98 JAMES D. COX El' AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 629-30 (4th
ed. 2004),
B9 See 15 U.S.C. § 77q; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
90 See 2 THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.11[1] [c], at 165
(5th ed. 2005); see also, e.g., Crookham v. Crookham, 914 F.2d 1027, 1029 (8th Cir. 1990).
91 See 3 HAZEN, supra note 90, § 12.4, at 199.
92 See 2 HAZEN, supra note 90, § 7.3[4], [7]—[8], at 71-81.
93 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12g-1, 240.14a-2.
94 15 U.S.C. § 77e; see 1 Louis Loss ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 580-781 (4th ed.
2006).
95 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d.
96 See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
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therefore investors forego the protections afforded by registration
(mandatory disclosure, SEC review, and anti-fraud causes of action),
exemptions include various conditions.
The most commonly relied upon exemption is Rule 506 of Regula-
tion D under the Securities Act. 97 To fall within Rule 506, the issuer
must limit the offering to accredited investors and what it reasonably
believes are no more than thirty-five non-accredited investors." Rule
501(a) defines "accredited investor" as, among other things, banks, in-
surance companies, mutual funds, and certain other specified institu-
tional investors; 99 individuals with net worths in excess of $1 million,'"
annual incomes in excess of $200,000, or joint annual incomes in ex-
cess of $300,000; 101 and executive officers and directors of the issuer. 102
Additionally, all non-accredited investors in the offering must be so-
phisticated, or the issuer must reasonably believe that they are sophisti-
cated.'"
Rule 506 requires the issuer to furnish any non-accredited inves-
tors that purchase securities in the offering certain specified informa-
tion about the issuer and the offering at a reasonable time prior to the
purchase.'" The rule contains no specific requirement that the issuer
furnish accredited investors information but does essentially instruct an
issuer to provide to accredited investors any information it furnished to
non-accredited investors. 1 °5 Further, the issuer is required to afford all
investors, whether accredited or not, "the opportunity to ask questions
and receive answers concerning the terms and conditions of the. offer-
ing. "Ios
Additionally, Rule 506 prohibits the issuer and anyone acting on its
behalf from soliciting investors in an offering made in reliance on Rule
97 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2008).
" Id. §§ 230.501(e), 230.506(b) (2) (i).
" Id. § 230.501(a) (1).
la° Id. § 230.501(a) (5) .
1 ° 1 Id. § 230.501 (a) (6) .
1 ° 2 See 17 C.F.R. § 230,501(a) (4).
1°!
	 id. § 230.506(6) (2) (ii). Sophistication in this context means that the investor
"has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment," either in his own right or
with the aid of one or more "purchaser representatives." Id. For the definition of 'pur-
chaser representative," see id. § 230.501(h).
1 " Id. § 230.502 (b) (1)—(2); see also id. § 230.506(6) (1).
'° See id. § 230.502(b)(1). Rule 502(6) (1) includes a note that provides as follows:
When an issuer provides information to investors pursuant to paragraph (b) (1), it should
consider providing such information to, accredited investors as well, in view of the anti-
fraud provisions of the federal securities laws." Id.
1 "1 Id. § 230.502(6) (2) (v).
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506 through any form of "general solicitation" or "general advertis-
ing." 1 °7 The SEC has interpreted this prohibition to restrict investors in
a company's private placement to those with whom the company or
someone acting on its behalf has a preexisting, substantive relation-
ship. 138 According to the SEC, the restriction is necessary because the
SEC has "long construed general solicitation or advertising to impart a
public character to an offering." 109 Consequently, "[ t.] he prohibition on
general solicitation and advertising is what keeps the offering 'private'
-lio
Finally, Rule 506 requires an issuer to take reasonable steps to pre-
vent resales of securities issued under the rule in violation of Section 5
of the Securities Act." Typical steps include (1) placing a restrictive
legend on the certificates representing the securities specifying that
they may not be sold unless the transaction is registered or the seller
furnishes the issuer an opinion of counsel that the proposed sale is ex-
empt from registration, and (2). instructing the issuer's transfer agent
not to process any transfer of the securities unless the transfer is cleared
by company counsel." 2
Regulation D contains two additional exemptions, Rules 504 113
and 505,"4 which the SEC promulgated under Section 3(b) of the Se-
curities Act. 115 Section 3(b) empowers the SEC to exempt offerings of
up to $5 million if a small amount is involved or if the offering is of lim-
ited character." 6 Under Rule 504, a company may offer and sell securi-
ties to an unlimited number of persons." 7 The total dollar amount of
the offering, however, cannot exceed $1 million." 8 Unlike Rule 506,
Rule 504 has no specific information requirements or limit on the
1 ° 7 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c), 230.506(b) (1).
108 See Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 13-14.
Hi° Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7943, 66 Fed. Reg.
8887. 8889 n.28 (Feb. 5, 2001).
110 See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
111 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) ("The issuer shall exercise reasonable care to assure that
the purchasers of the securities are not underwriters within the meaning of section
2(a) (11) of the [Securities] Act . ."); id. § 230.506(b) (1) (requiring offers and sales un-
der the rule to satisfy all the conditions of Rule 502).
112 See 3 Loss ET AL., supra note 94, at 411-14; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (listing
measures the issuer can take to assure that investors are not underwriters).
1 " 17 C.F.R. § 230.504.
114 Id. § 230.505.
115 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b).
110 Id.
117 Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption, Securities Act
Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,090, 11,090 (Mar. 8, 1999).
us 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (2).
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number of "non-accredited" investors that may participate in the offer-
ing,n9 and it permits general solicitation and advertising under limited
circumstances.'" Rule 505 is identical to Rule 506 except that the total
dollar amount of the offering cannot exceed $5 million, 121 and Rule
505 does not impose a sophistication requirement for non-accredited
investors. t22
Although Rule 504 and Rule 505 offer some advantages over Rule
506, Rule 506 is generally the preferred Regulation D exemption be-
cause a security sold under it falls within the definition of "covered se-
curity" and is, therefore, exempt from state registration and qualifica-
tion requirements.'" Conversely, a security sold under Rule 504 or 505
is not a covered security: 124 As a result, an offering under either of these
exemptions would need to be registered, qualified, or exempt under
the securities laws of each state in which offers were made, adding to
119 1 IILOOMENTHAL, supra note 34, § 9:29, at 529-3L
I2U 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (1). General solicitation is permitted only in an offering in
reliance on Rule 504 if the offering is made
(i) [e]xclusively in one or more states that provide for the registration of
the securities, and require the public filing and delivery to investors of a sub-
stantive disclosure document before sale, and are made in accordance with
those state provisions;
(ii) in one or more states that have no provision for the registration of the
securities or the public filing or delivery of a disclosure document before sale,
if the securities have been registered in at least one state that provides for
such registration, public filing and delivery before sale, offers and sales are
made in that state in accordance with such provisions, and the disclosure
document is delivered before sale to all purchasers (including those in the
states that have no such procedure); or
(iii) exclusively according to state law exemptions from registration that
permit general solicitation and general advertising so long as sales are made
only to 'accredited investors" ....
Id.
121 Id. § 230.505(b) (2) (i)•
122 Cf. id. § 230.506(b) (2) (ii).
123 See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)—(b) (defining "covered security"). As a general matter, anyone
offering or selling securities must also comply with the securities laws of the states in which
they are making the offers and sales, all of which, except for the state of New fork, require
registration of the offering with state regulators unless the offering falls within an exemption.
1 Loss ET AL., supra note 94, at 155-222. In 1996, however, Congress passed the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act ("NSMIA") which preempts state registration require-
ments for "covered securities." See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-290, §§ 301-308, 110 Stat. 3416, 3936-40 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
124 15 U.S.C. § 77r.
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the transaction costs associated with the offering. c25 Rule 506 has the
additional advantage of having no monetary cap on the size of the of-
fering. 126
Obviously, a private company's ability to raise capital through a se-
curities offering is greatly constrained. If the company relies on Rule
506, it may solicit only potential investors with whom the company or
someone acting on its behalf has a preexisting, substantive relationship;
it cannot allow more than thirty-five non-accredited purchasers to invest
in ari offering; and it must reasonably believe that any non-accredited
investors it does allow to invest are sophisticated)" If the company in-
stead opts for Rule 504 or Rule 505, it has more flexibility with respect to
taking non-accredited investors (Rule 504 has no cap on number, and
neither rule has a sophistication requirement), but the company will be
limited to raising $1 million or $5 million, respectively, in the offer-
ing) 28 Further, various institutions (for example, national banks, state
commercial banks, federal and state savings associations, and federal
savings banks), although falling under the definition of accredited in-
vestor, are prohibited from purchasing private company securities) 29
b. Share Illiquidity
Another disadvantage of remaining private is share illiquidity)"
Because SEC regulations restrict the resale of securities issued by a
company in an exempt offering or private placement, there is no pub-
lic market for the securities of a private company and, therefore, its
shares are illiquid. 151 As a result, the company is unable to use its stock
as currency for an acquisition, equity compensation is not particularly
attractive to employees, founders are not able to diversify easily, and
early-stage investors are not able to cash out.
125 Each of the fifty states has its own securities laws. Seel Loss ET At.., supra note 94, at
61-142. These laws lack uniformity in many areas, including registration requirements and
exemptions. See id. (emphasizing the need for uniformity). Thus, an issuer conducting a
multistate private placement subject to state registration requirements would incur addi-
tional legal fees in navigating what could be a complicated maze of overlapping and vary-
ing state laws. See Sjostrom, supra note 17, at 587.
526 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
127 See id.
126 See id. §§ 230.504(b) (2). 230.505(b) (2) (i).
1" Seeleanne M. Campanelli & Peter Castellon, The Mechanics of Rule 144A/Regulation S
Underwritings, in SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2006: OPERATING UNDER 111E NEW RULES 387,
426-27 (Williami Whelan III ed., 2006).
150 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2008).
151 See id,
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Resales of privately placed securities are restricted to prevent an
issuer from circumventing the registration requirements of the Securi-
ties Act by selling securities to persons in a private placement with the
intent that those persons will immediately resell the securities to the
public."2 The restrictions are reflected in Rule 144 under the Securi-
ties Act. 133 Rule 144 specifies conditions under which an investor can
resell "restricted securities," the definition of which includes securities
issued in a private placement. 134 The rule essentially requires investors
to hold the stock of a private company for at least one year before re-
selling. 135 Even after the one year holding period has run, investors
must contend with a number of formalities to sell the shares, including
filling out various forms and obtaining a legal opinion that the resale
can be made without registration. 136
Given the holding period and other requirements of Rule 144 and
the formalities associated with selling restricted stock, it is not possible
for a liquid market to develop for private company stock. As a result, a
private company has to offer its stock at a discount to what it would
command in a public offering. 137 Put differently, investors require
compensation in the form of a price discount for investing in private
company stock because it will be much more difficult for investors to
later liquidate their investments. In the absence of a public market, an
investor will have to search for and locate a willing buyer and then ne-
gotiate and document the transaction as opposed to simply calling a
broker or entering a trade online.
II. THE NEED FOR A NEW PATH
Exchange listed companies have been subject to extensive regula-
don and liability exposure since 1934, yet countless companies have
transitioned seamlessly from private to public companies over the dec-
ades, raising billions of dollars of equity capital in the process. 138 Con-
132
	 7 J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF




134 See id. § 230.144 (a) (3).
136 See id. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii).
136 See 8B ARNOLD S. JACOBS, OPINION LETTERS IN SECURITIES MATTERS § 58 (2008)
(describing formalities associated with selling restricted stock).
137 See Aswath Damodaran, Marketability and Value: Measuring the Illiquidity Discount
17 (July 30, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=841484.
138 See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. NIKTS, ASSN, FACT BOOK 2007, at 22 (2007) (detailing total
equity raised from 1985 to 2006).
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sequently, there has been no apparent need for an additional path to
equity capital and liquid stock. The passage of SOX, however, appears
to have changed this situation. For example, in the last few years an in-
creasing number of U.S. private firms have gone public outside the
United States, 159 an increasing number of U.S. public firms have gone
private, 140 and an increasing number of foreign firms have left or es-
chewed the U.S. public markets. 141 Regardless, adding .a new path
should enhance capital formation, part of the stated mission of the
SEC. 142 This Part describes the increased regulation and liability expo-
sure imposed on public companies by SOX. 143 It then discusses the
shortcomings of available IPO alternatives for private companies.'"
A. Sarbartes-Oxley Act
SOX was passed in 2002 in the wake of the massive accounting
frauds discovered at Enron and WorldCom. 145 It imposes an array of
additional requirements on public companies and ramps up liability
exposure. The stated purpose of SOX is Itlo protect investors by im-
proving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pur-
suant to the securities laws." In that regard, SOX includes various pro-
visions addressing the content, timing, and reliability of disclosure. 147
As for content, the most infamous provision is undoubtedly Sec-
tion 404. 148 Section 404(a) directs the SEC to adopt rules requiring
firms' annual reports to include an internal control report that
"state [s] the responsibility of management for establishing and main-
taining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for fi-
1" See COMM. ON CAPITAL !vitas. REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE
U.S. PUBLIC Egurry MARKET 2 (2007), available at http://www.capinktsreg.org/ixifs/The_
Competitive_Position_of the_US_Public_Equity_Market.pdf. 	 ,
140 See William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going
Private, - 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 154 (2006).
141 See COMM. ON CAPITAL NUTS. REGULATION, supra note 139, at 3.
142 See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects In-
vestors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.
gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2009) ("The mission of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.").
145 See infra notes 145-168 and accompanying text.
144 See infra notes 169-194 and accompanying text.
145 See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Gov-
ernance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005).
146 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Preamble, 116 Stat. 745, 745
(2002).
147 See 1 BLOOMENTIIAL, supra note 34, § 1.34, at 32.
140 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006).
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nancial reporting" and "contain [s] an assessment ... of the effective-
ness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for
financial reporting." 149
 The SEC adopted elaborate rules implementing
Section 404(a) in June 2003. 150 Section 404(b) requires firms' auditors
to "attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the management
of the issuer." 51
 In March 2004, the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board, a board created by SOX Section 101 "to oversee the audit
of public companies,"' 52 adopted Audit Standard No. 2, which provides
extensive guidelines and rules for auditing a firm's internal controls in
connection with providing the required attestation and report. 153
As for timing of disclosure, Section 409 of SOX amended the Ex-
change Act to require public companies to "disclose to the public on a
rapid and current basis such additional information concerning mate-
rial changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer ... as
the [SEC] determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection
of investors and in the public interest." 154 In response, the SEC ex-
panded the list of events that trigger a public company's obligation to
file a current report. 155 The SEC also decreased the filing deadline for
a current report from five or fifteen calendar days (depending on the
triggering event) following the triggering event to four business days
for most even ts. 156
149
 Id. § 7262(a).
15° See Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting, Securities
Act Release No. 8238, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003). For a description of these rules, see 1
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 34, § 12:48.20, at 672.
151 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b).
152 Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211.
153 See PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., AUDITING STANDARD No. '2 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules_of  the_tioard/Auditing_Standard_2.pdf. Note
that Auditing Standard No. 2 has been superseded by Auditing Standard No. 5 for audits of
Fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2007. See PUB. CO . ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT
BD., AUDITING STANDARD No. 5, at 397 n.2 (2007), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/
Rules/Rules of the_Board/Auditing_Standard_5.pdf; Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
Standards and Related Rules, http://www.pcaobus.org/Standards/Standards_and_Related_
Rules/Auditing_Standard_No.5.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
154 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 409, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(I).
155 See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,
Securities Act Release No. 8400, Exchange Act Release No. 49,429, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594,
15,594 (Mar. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Form 8-K Release]. The Release notes that in response
to § 409 the "amendments add eight new items to the form, transfer two items from the
periodic reports and expand disclosures under two existing Form 8-K items," See id. For an
overview of the amendments, see 1 BLoomEmum., supra note 34, § 12:52, at 680. For a
brief discussion of current reports, see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
156 See Form 8-K Release, supra note 155, at 15,594,
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SOX includes several provisions relating to the reliability of disclo-
sure. Section 302 requires senior officers to certify in each annual and
quarterly report that they have reviewed the report, that the report is
free of misstatements of material fact or misleading omissions of mate-
rial fact, and that the report fairly presents the financial condition and
results of operation of the company. 57 Additionally, signing officers
must certify that they are responsible for establishing and maintaining
the company's internal controls, have evaluated the effectiveness of
such controls, and disclosed to the company's auditor and audit com-
mittee all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of such
controls. 158
Similarly; Section 906 requires a company's chief executive officer
and chief financial officer to certify in each annual and quarterly report
"that information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the issuer," 158 An erroneous certification can lead to personal liability
for the certifier, and hence a certifier has a strong incentive to ensure
reliability of the reports. 18° In fact, Section 906 provides for criminal
fines of up to $1 million and jail time of up to ten years for a knowingly
false certification, and $5 million and twenty years for a willfully and
knowingly false certification. tot
SOX also amended the federal criminal code to make it unlawful to
knowingly execute or attempt to execute a scheme or artifice (1) "to
defraud any person in connection with any security" of a reporting
company or (2) "to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, any money or property in connection with
' 57 Sarbanes.Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
158 Id,
159 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
'w See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7202. Section 3 (b) of SOX pro-
vides:
A violation by any person of [SOX] [or] any rule or regulation of the [SEC]
issued under [SOX] ... shall be treated for all purposes in the same manner
as a violation of the [Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations issued
thereunder ... and any such person shall be subject to the same penalties,
and to the same extent, as for a violation of [the Exchange Act] or such rules
or regulations.
•	 Id.
161 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350.
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the purchase or sale of any security" of a reporting company. 162 Viola-
tors are subject to fines and imprisonment up to twenty-five years, t65
Costs of SOX include increased audit, human capital, and other
compliance expenses. A recent survey conducted by Financial Execu-
tives International found that compliance costs for SOX Section 404
alone averaged $1.66 million per U.S. accelerated filer. 164 Costs of SOX
also likely include reduced risk taking by management in light of the
heightened liability risk. 165 Additionally, many of the increased compli-
ance costs disproportionately effect smaller firms because of the firms'
reduced economies of scale. t66
No one disputes that SOX has increased the cost of being public.
What is disputed is whether the benefits of SOX outweigh the costs. At
a macro level, the debate is unlikely ever to be resolved. 167 At a micro
level, however, there undoubtedly are companies for which the costs
outweigh the benefits, thus underscoring the need for a SOX-free path
to equity capital and share liquidity. 168
162 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
16S Id.
164 FIN. EXECUTIVES	 FEI Anon FEE SURVEY 12 (2008). An accelerated filer is a
reporting company that had an aggregate worldwide market value of the voting and non-
voting common equity held by its non-affiliates of $75 million or more, but less than $700
million, as of the last business day of the [company's] most recently completed second
fiscal quarter." 17 C.F.R. § 240.126-2(1)(i) (2008).
166 See Daniel A. Cohen et. al., The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for Com-
pensation Contracts and Managerial Risk-Taking 4 (Nov. 9, 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
available at hup://ssrn.comiabstract=1027448 (finding that risky investments by companies
declined significantly following the passage of SOX).
Um See Ehud Kalmar et al., Sarbanes-Oxley's Effects on Small Firms: What Is the Evidence? 1
(Harvard Law Sch., Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 588, 2007), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993198.
167 See Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29
CAanozo L. REV. 703, 762 (2007) ("1111 is impossible at this point in time to accurately
weigh SOX's total benefits against its total costs. None of the scores of academic studies
cited in this article purports to settle definitively the question of whether SOX in general
or SOX 409 in particular have been, on balance, beneficial."); see also Christian Leuz, Was
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really This Costly? A Discussion of Evidence from Event Returns and
Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 146, 146-65 (2007).
168 See Feng Gao et. al., Unintended Consequences of Granting Small Firms Exemptions from
Securities Regulation: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 3 (Simon Sch. of Bus. Admin., Univ.
of Rochester, Working Paper No. FR 07-07, 2008), available at http://ssrn.corn/abstract=
1014054 (noting that managers may seek to avoid application of SOX to their companies
because they believe complying reduces shareholder value).
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B. Shortcomings of Alternatives
One alternative to a U.S. IPO is to go public abroad. 159 For exam-
ple, in recent years a number of U.S. firms have listed their shares on
the . London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market following
an overseas IP0. 17° This route allows a company to raise equity capital
and attain share liquidity without subjecting itself to U.S. securities
regulations. 171 A company that goes public abroad, however, does not
realize all of the benefits that accrue from a U.S. IPO. For example, the
company does not have freely tradable U.S. stock at its disposal to use
as currency in an acquisition or as a component of employee compen-
sation. Further, the company must carefully monitor its shareholder
base to ensure that it has fewer than 300 U.S. shareholders and 500 to-
tal shareholders because surpassing these thresholds would subject the
company to U.S. securities regulations. 172 Additionally, as the Commit-
tee on Capital Markets Regulation has argued, losing listings to over-
seas markets weakens the U.S. capital markets, which means "higher
costs of capital for U.S. companies, reduced asset values, fewer jobs, and
less economic activity across the entire country."'"
Another alternative to going public is a Rule 144A equity offer-
ing. 174 Rule 144A under the Securities Act enables a company to mar-
ket and sell securities through an underwriter to "qualified institutional
buyers" ("QIBs") without registering the offering with the SEC or trig-
gering Exchange Act reporting obligations: 175 The definition of a QIB
includes institutional investors (for example, insurance companies,
pension funds, mutual funds, employee benefit plans, hedge funds,
and banks) that have at least $100 million of securities under manage-
ment.'" Until recently, however, Rule 144A was unheard of as an IPO
169 See Jose M. Mendoza, Securities Regulation in Low-Tier Listing Venues; The Rise of the Al-
ternative Investment Market, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 257, 284-85 n.145 (2008);
Stephen Taub, IrCs Look for Payday in London, CFO.coM, Feb. 3, 2006, http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/5487545/c_5487722?f=home_todayinfinance.
170 See Mendoza, supra note 169, at 284-85 n.145 (noting that Fifty-one U.S. companies
had listed on AIM as of Oct. 30, 2006); Taub, supra note 169 (noting that nineteen U.S.
companies went public on AIM in 2005).
171 See Mendoza, supra note 169, at 258.
"2 Id. at 324-25.
173 COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 23 (2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/
11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf.
174 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008).
179 See id.
176 Id. § 144A(a)(i). A registered broker-dealer qualifies as a QIE if it owns and invests
on a discretionary basis an aggregate of at least $10 million of securities of non-affiliated
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substitute. This changed in May 2007 when Oaktree Capital Manage-
ment LLC, a leading private U.S. hedge fund advisory firm, sold a 15
percent equity stake in itself for $880 million under Rule 144A. 177
Following the sale, Oaktree's equity securities immediately started
trading on the GS Tradable Unregistered Equity OTC Market
("GSTrUE"), a new market created by Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. to
facilitate trading in Rule 144A equity securities. 178 GSTrUE, it was
hoped, would enable a liquid QIB trading market to develop for Rule
144A-eligible equity securities. 179 This, in turn, would provide a private
company a route to share liquidity without going public. 180 Although it
is too early to tell whether the Oaktree deal represents a watershed
event—especially given recent market turmoil—initial reports indi-
cated that trading of Oaktree's securities on GSTrUE was not particu-
larly active with shares "sometimes not trading for days at a time. " 181
Since then, GSTrUE has been consolidated with PORTAL, a QM-only
market for Rule 144A-eligible securities operated by NASDAQ. 182
Several months after the Oaktree deal, Goldman managed a simi-
lar $828 million Rule 144A equity offering for Apollo Global Manage-
ment, LLC, a renowned U.S. private equity firm. 188 Apollo's securities
also immediately started trading on GSTrUE. 184 Unlike Oaktree, .Apollo
entered into a registration rights agreement with investors in the deal.
The registration rights agreement obligated Apollo to file with the SEC
a shelf registration statement covering resale of its shares within 240
days.'tt Apollo filed the registration statement on April 8, 2008, 186 es-
sentially transitioning from a private to a public company. 187
companies, excluding securities that are part of an unsold public offering allotment. See id.
§ 144A(a)(1)(ii).
177 See Oaktree Stock Sale Completed, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2007, at C2.
178 See Henry Sender, Oaktrre to Try a New Twist for Share Sale: Use of Goldman Market Avoids
Regulations, Doesn't Cede Control, IV Au. ST. J., May 10, 2007, at Cl (describing GSTrUE).
179 See id.
MO see id.
181 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Michael J. de la Merced, Buyout Firms Said to Seek a Private
Market Offering, N.Y. Tim ES, July 18, 2007, at Cs.
182 Sec William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144.4 Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV.
409, 430-32 (2008) (discussing PORTAL).
183 See Apollo Raises $828 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2008, at C6.
184 See id.
1135 See Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 220 (Apr. 8,
2008),
188 See id.
187 See id. Apollo technically will not be required to file Exchange Act reports until its
registration statement is declared effective. Sec supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text
(describing Exchange Act reporting triggers).
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It is unclear why the Apollo deal included registration rights, but
the fact that it did, and the fact that trading in Oaktree's securities has
not been active, may indicate that Rule 144A equity offerings are not a
panacea." 80 Rule 144A was not specifically designed to facilitate equity
offerings by private companies and, hence, has its limitations as applied
in that context. Most notably, companies have to put some sort of
mechanism in place (contractual restrictions, minimum lot sizes, etc.) to
ensure that they do not exceed the 499 record holder cap as a result of
secondary trading by investors. 189 This undoubtedly makes the shares
less attractive to investors and negatively impacts liquidity. Furthermore,
Rule 144A does not allow general solicitation and advertising, and indi-
vidual investors cannot participate in Rule 144A equity offerings, regard-
less of net worth. 19° As a result, the deals cannot be publicly marketed,
and the pool of potential investors is limited to institutions.'"
Finally, a private company has the option of selling itself to a larger
company instead of pursuing an IP0. 192 A sale would allow founders
and investors to cash out, as their shares would typically be exchanged
for cash or liquid stock in the acquisition.' 93 A sale, however, also re-
quires founders to relinquish control.'" Thus, from a founder's stand-
point, a sale is not really an IPO substitute.
III. PROPOSAL
To address the rising cost of going public and shortcomings of ex-
isting alternatives, this Part outlines and justifies proposed changes to
federal securities laws. Specifically, it calls for (1) a new exemption from
Section 5 of the Securities Act that allows general solicitation and adver-
tising for offerings limited to sophisticated investors, (2) an amendment
to Rule 144 to allow immediate resales to sophisticated investors of secu-
rities issued under the new Section 5 exemption, (3) a new rule pre-
empting the application of state registration or qualification require-
ments to securities offered and sold under the new Section 5 exemp-
tion, and (4) a new exemption from Section 12(g) (1) of the Exchange
Act exempting companies with 100 or fewer unsophisticated sharehold-
MB See Sorkin & de la Merced, supra note 181.
If* See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2006).
190 See Sjostrom, supra note 182, at 445.
191 See id.
192 See Black & Gilson, supra note 27, at 261.
192 See id.
191 See id.
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ers from having to register under the Act. 195 The objective of this pro-
posal is to carve a new path to equity capital and share liquidity for pri-
vate companies without compromising investor protection. Suggested
text for these provisions is included in the Appendix to this Article.
_A. Section 5 Exemption
A new Section 5 exemption is necessary to allow a private company
to market and sell its shares publicly in a similar fashion to an 11'0. 196
Existing exemptions either do not work for large, widespread offerings
or specifically prohibit the use of general solicitation and advertising. 197
Hence, the new exemption would eliminate a major constraint on pri-
vate company capital raising. Although the exemption would limit sales
to sophisticated investors, it would not so limit offers. 198 Thus, a com-
pany could use a full range of marketing techniques without having to
worry about inadvertently soliciting unsophisticated investors.
Arguably, adopting an exemption that permits general solicitation
and advertising could lead to more securities fraud. Promoters of
fraudulent invesunent schemes could engage in widespread advertising
claiming it is allowed by the new exemption. Although the current fed-
eral and state regulatory scheme may not deter such promoters from
using all forms of public advertising, it likely curtails their activities. For
example, if their solicitation activities are too public they will attract the
attention of the SEC or state regulators. With this in mind,-the Section
5 exemption proposed here would allow general solicitation and adver-
tising, but only through broker-dealers registered with both the SEC
and the states in which the solicitation is directed. 199 The exemption
also would require that written solicitation materials specify the name
of the registered broker-dealer making the solicitation. 200 Presumably, a
promoter of a fraudulent scheme will not have the requisite registra-
tion or will omit listing a broker-dealer entirely, either of which would
serve as an easily verifiable basis for the SEC or state securities regula-
tors to pursue a cease and desist order or injunction.
' 0 See infra app. at 681-83.
196 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2008).
197 See id.
198 See infra app. at 681-82 (proposing a new § 230.508(c) (2)).
199 See id. at 681 (proposing a new § 230.508(c) (2) (ii)).
200 See id.
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Because this proposal is targeted at private company capital rais-
ing, the exemption would not be available to a company with securities
registered under the Exchange Act."'
B. Rule 144 Amendment
An amendment to Rule 144 is necessary because Section 5 of the
Securities Act prohibits the offer and sale of any security unless the
transaction is registered with the SEC or is exempt from registration. 282
Consequently, every sale of securities must be registered or exempt. 203
Put differently, because of the transactional focus of Section 5, a resel-
ler of securities must either register the resale with the SEC or structure
the resale so that it qualifies for an exemption from registration. 284 The
issuer's registration or exemption covers only the original sale transac-
tion; that is, the sale from the issuer to the reseller.
Typically, resales of securities are exempt from registration under
Section 4(1) of the Securities Act. 285 Section 4(1) exempts from regis-
tration "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer."206 Section 4(1), however, is not available for the immediate re-
sale of privately placed securities. 207 This is because Section 2(a) (11) of
the Securities Act defines the term "underwriter," among other things,
as "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to ... the
distribution of any security." 208 Under SEC interpretations, anyone who
sells privately placed securities is presumed to be an underwriter unless
the sale is made in compliance with Securities Act Rule 144. 209 Rule 144
sets forth conditions under which a person who sells privately placed
securities "is deemed not to be engaged in a distribution of [such] se-
curities and therefore not an underwriter of the securities for purposes
of Section 2(a) (11) [of the Securities Act]."21° A non-affiliate of an is-
suer—such as a person who does not directly or indirectly control the
2°1 Sec id. (proposing a new § 230.508(b)).
402
	 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
203 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144, Preliminary Note (If any person sells a non-exempt secu-
rity to any other person, the sale must be registered unless an exemption can be found for
the transaction:).
204 see id.
205 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1).
2°6 Id.
2°2 See id. § 77b(a)(11).
266 Id.
209 17 C.F.R. § 230.144, Preliminary Note,
21 ° Id.
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issuer201 —must hold privately placed securities issued by a private com-
pany at least one year before the securities can be sold under Rule
144. 212
This proposal includes an amendment to Rule 144 to allow the
immediate resale to sophisticated investors of securities issued under
the Section 5 exemption proposed above. 213 The aim is to provide a
regulatory avenue for an active SIO secondary market to develop for
shares issued under the exemption so that a private company could
attain share liquidity without going public. 214
C. Preemption
Similar to the Securities Act, most states require the registration of
a securities offering with state regulators unless the offering falls within
a state registration exemption. 215 State exemptions generally track ex-
isting federal exemptions. That is, with certain exceptions, if an offer-
ing is exempt under federal securities laws it will fall into an exemption
under state securities laws. 216 This, however, would not necessarily be
the case for a new federal exemption, especially one that allows general
solicitation and advertising. Unless a large majority of jurisdictions
amend their exemptions to accommodate the proposed Section 5 ex-
emption, the attractiveness of relying on the new exemption would be
greatly diminished. This is because an issuer would have to register the
offering in each unaccommodating jurisdiction or not offer securities
in the jurisdiction. Registering is costly and time consuming, especially
because of the lack of uniformity among state registration require-
men ts, 2" and not marketing an offering in a particular state obviously
reduces the pool of potential investors. This proposal sidesteps the state
law issue by providing that state registration requirements with respect
to offerings under the proposed Section 5 exemption would be pre-
empted by federal law
211 See id. § 230.144 (a) (1) (defining 'affiliate").
212 See id. § 230.144(b) (1) (i), (d) (1) (ii). In some situations, Rule 144 allows investors
to include the holding period of previous investors in determining when their holding
period ends. See id. § 230.144(d). Rule 144 imposes additional conditions for the resale of
restricted stock by an "affiliate" of an issuer. See, e.g., id. § 230.144(c), (e), (h).
213 See infra app. at 682 (proposing a new § 230.144).
211 See id.
215 See 1 Loss ET AL., supra note 94, al 195.
216 See id. at 222.
217 See Sjostrom, supra note 17, at 544-50 (providing an overview of state registration
requirements).
20091	 .Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity 	 665
D. Exchange Act Section 12(g) Exemption.
An exemption from Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act is neces-
sary so that an SIO company does not have to monitor and limit the
number of record holders of its equity securities. 218 As mentioned
above, Section 12(g) (1) of the Exchange Act requires any company
with more than $10 million in total assets and a class of equity securities
held of record by 500 or more holders to register such security under
the Exchange Act. 218 This inherent monitoring and limiting obligation
would impede the development of a liquid SIO market. 22° As is the case
for Rule 144A offerings by private companies, issuers would, for exam-
ple, have to impose contractual restrictions on transfer or establish
minimum lot sizes in which their shares could be transferred to ensure
a maximum number of record holders below 500. 221 Such restrictions
would make the shares more difficult to trade and, therefore, less liq-
uid. To address this issue, this proposal includes an exemption from
Section 12(g) (1) for a class of equity securities beneficially owned by
100 or fewer unsophisticated investors. 222 The exemption would permit
companies to have up to 100 unsophisticated shareholders to allow
them to issue shares to unsophisticated employees and as built-in relief
for companies that have inadvertently issued shares to a limited num-
ber of unsophisticated investors. 228
E. "Sophisticated Investor" Definition
A key component of this proposal is the definition of "sophisti-
cated investor," given that the concept is embodied in three of the four
proposed rule changes. 224 The SEC has previously formulated a defini-
tion. Specifically, the SEC considers an investor sophisticated "if the
219 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(g)(1).
219 See id. Note that Section 12(g) (1) actually specifies a "total assets" cutoff of $1 mil-
lion, but Rule 12g-I under the Exchange Act exempts issuers with $10 million or less in
total assets from the application of Section 12(g) (1), essentially setting the cutoff at $10
million. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1.
22° See 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1).
221 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A.
222 This approach is similar to one taken by Congress in the Investment Company Act
of 1940. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-64 (2006). Specifically, an investment company whose
securities are owned "exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securi-
ties, are qualified puichasers" and that is not making or proposing to mike a public offer-
ing is not considered an investment company for purposes of the Investment Company Act
and is therefore not required to register under it. Id. § 80a-3(c) (7).
223 See infra app. at 683 (proposing a new § 240.12g-1).
221 See infra app. at 681-683.
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investor, either alone or with his or her representative, has such knowl-
edge and experience in financial and business matters to be capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment." 225 The
problem with this formulation is that it requires subjective investor-
specific determinations of knowledge and experience that a court or
the SEC could later decide were erroneous. 226 Hence, many attorneys
would likely view reliance on an exemption containing such a standard
as too risky and would advise their clients accordingly, which would
render this proposal of limited value.
The SEC is cognizant of the practical effect of using subjective
standards. Thus, over the years it has developed various objective tests
that use wealth as a proxy for determining sophistication in different
contexts based on the assumption that the wealthy are sophisticated in
financial matters or can afford to hire advisers who are. Two of these
tests were mentioned above: the QIB test of Rule 144A and the accred-
ited investor test of Regulation D. 227 Other tests include the "qualified
purchasers" test of Section 3(c) (7) of the Investment Company Act of
1940, under which entities with $25 million in investments and indi-
viduals with $5 million in investments are considered qualified pur-
chasers; 228 and the "qualified client" test of Rule 205-3 of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, under which individuals are considered
qualified clients if they have at least $750,000 under management with
the adviser, have a net worth of more than $1.5 million, are qualified
purchasers under the Investment Company Act, or are employees of
the adviser who have participated in the investment activities of the ad-
viser for at least twelve months. 229
The accredited investor concept is the logical choice to serve as a
proxy for sophistication for purposes of this proposa1. 2" Unlike the
qualified purchaser and qualified buyer tests, it was designed specifi-
cally with reference to exempt offerings, and .unlike the QIB test, it
would allow individuals (and not just institutional investors) to invest in
223 Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7943, 66 Fed. Reg.
8887, 888811,15 (Feb. 5, 2001).
223 See id.
227 For an explanation of the QIB test, see supra notes 174-177 and accompanying
text. For an explanation of the accredited investor test, see supra notes 97-103 and accom-
panying text.
223 15 U.S.C. 55 80a-2(a) (51), 80a-3(c) (7),
229 17 C.F.R. 5 275.205-3 (2006). Rule 205-3 provides a limited exemption from the In-
vestment Company Act's prohibition on charging clients performance fees. See id.
230 See id. 5 230.501.
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SIO companies."' Further, the SEC has used the accredited investor
concept as a sophistication proxy for over twenty-five years and recently
stated that "it strikes the appropriate balance between the necessity for
investor protection and meaningful relief for issuers offering securi-
ties."232 Additionally, Congress endorsed the concept when it amended
the Securities Act in .1980 to provide a registration exemption for offer-
ings limited to accredited investors. 233 The legislative history of the
amendment states that the concept is "based on the assumption that
accredited persons are sophisticated and able enough to protect their
own financial interests without regulatory assistance." 234
A common criticism of the accredited investor concept, especially
as applied to individuals, is that the net worth and income dollar
thresholds were set in 1982, but have never been adjusted upward for
inflation. 235 One dollar in 1982 has the same buying power as $2.19 in
2009, meaning that the thresholds have essentially been reduced by
more than 50 percent. 236 These implicit decreases have been amelio-
rated to some extent, at least according to the SEC, by "the general in-
creased sophistication and financial literacy of investors in today's mar-
kets, coupled with the advantages of modern communication tech-
nologies."237 Additionally, the SEC recently proposed adjusting the
thr6holds for inflation "on a going forward basis, starting on July 1,
2012, and every five years thereafter" using 2006 as the base year. 238
The accredited investor concept has also been criticized for being
under-inclusive. 239 For example, a finance professor with net worth un-
der $1 million and yearly income under $200,000 would not qualify as
an accredited investor even though he surely would be considered so-
phisticated with respect to financial matters. This is a cost of using an
" 1 See id.
232 Defining the Term "Qualified Purchaser" Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 8041, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,839, 66,840 n.18 (proposed Dec. 27, 2001).
255 See Small Business Issuers' Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 602, 94
Stat. 2275, 2294 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d (6)).
254 H.R. REP. No. 96-1341, at 21 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800, 4803.
235 Ste Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8825, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (proposed Aug. 10, 2007).
238 See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://
data.b1s.govicgi-bin/cpicalc.p1 (enter "1.00" in the 1" field, select 1982" in the first "in"
field, and select "2009" in the second "in" field) (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
2" See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, 72 Fed. Reg. at
45,118.
238 See id. at 45,126.
239 See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 279, 310-11 (2000).
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objective rule as opposed to a subjective standard to determine sophis-
tication, but, in my view, the cost is outweighed by the benefits of the
certainty provided by the rule. Further, the situation could be remedied
by allowing non-accredited investors to demonstrate sophistication by
passing a sophisticated-investor licensing exam created and adminis-
tered by the SEC. 24° Regardless, non-accredited investors would be free
to invest indirectly in companies listed on an SIO market through in-
termediaries such as mutual funds. Presumably, if an SIO market were
to develop, new mutual funds would be launched that target companies
listed on the market, thereby providing investors an easy way to allocate
a slice of their portfolios to the sector.
F. Implementation
The Securities Act reforms proposed here can be implemented
under existing federal securities laws as a result of the National Secu-
rities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA"). 241 Among other
things, NSMIA added Section 28 to the Securities Act, which provides
the SEC with the power to exempt any class of securities or transac-
tions from any provision of the Securities Act "to the extent that such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is
consistent with the protection of investors." 242 NSMIA also added sub-
section (b) to Section 2 of the Securities Act, which provides that
when the SEC "is engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider
or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, the [SEC] shall also consider, in addition to the pro-
tection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, com-
petition, and capital formation." 245
The Section 5 exemption and the amendments to Rule 144 pro-
posed here meet the standard of Section 28 as elucidated by Section
2(b). 244 As discussed above, this proposal would facilitate capital raising
by creating a new path to equity capital and liquid stock without sub-
jecting the issuer to extensive regulation and liability exposure. At the
same time, these provisions are consistent with investor protection be-
cause their scopes are limited to sophisticated investors. At least since
1953, when the Supreme Court decided SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., it has
21°
	 id. at 311 (discussing investor licensing as a screening mechanism).
241 See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
§§ 301-308,110 Stat. 3916,3436-40 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
242 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3.
2" Id. § 77b.
244 See id. §§ 77b, 77z-3.
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been firmly established that sophisticated investors do not need the
same protections as unsophisticated ones. 245 In the words of the Su-
preme Court, the sophisticated can "fend for themselves" and, There-
fore, require considerably fewer legal safeguards. 246 As the SEC has rec-
ognized, "[t]he Securities Act was remedial legislation designed 'to pro-
tect the investing public and honest business.' The 'investing public'
intended to benefit from the registration provisions of the Securities
Act was unsophisticated, individual investors." 247 Hence, it is axiomatic
that because this Article's proposal excludes participation by the unso-
phisticated, it is consistent with investor protection as espoused in the
Securities Act. 248
Furthermore, the proposed amendment to Rule 144 is in harmony
with the so-called "Section 4(1 44) exemption" under the Securities Act.
Although not actually appearing in the statute, the Section 4 (1- 1h) ex-
emption has long been recognized by the SEC. 249 As a general matter,
the exemption allows an investor to immediately resell privately placed
securities to someone who could have bought them in the original offer-
ing. 25° For example, if the offering was made in reliance on Rule 506, an
investor could likely immediately resell the securities to an accredited
investor. Nonetheless, the amendment to Rule 144 is included in this
proposal because the parameters of the Section 4(1-1/2) exemption re-
main unsettled. 25 ' This uncertainty would likely impede the develop-
ment of a secondary market. In fact, commentators have characterized
selling restricted securities outside of Rule 144 as "imprudent or impos-
sible."252 Hence, this proposal opts for the certainty of a formal rule.
As for preemption of state registration requirements, this can be
achieved through Section 18 of the Securities Act as amended by
242 See 346 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1953). Congress recognized this fact when it enacted the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. See Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
The Act, among other things, created a new category of futures markets for certain com-
modities-based products that is generally only open to specified qualified investors. See
HAZEN, supra note 90, § 22.7.
246 See Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125.
247 See Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Pe-
riod of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6806, 53
Fed. Reg. 44,016, 44,023 (proposed Nov. 1, 1988).
2" See id.
249 See Employee Benefit Plans; Interpretations of Statute, Securities Act Release No.
6188, 45 Fed. Reg. 8960, 8977 n.178 (Feb. 11, 1980) (acknowledging the existence of the
section 4(1-1/2) exemption).
2" See id.
221 See Sjostrom, supra note 182, at 420.
252 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTIIAL & SAMUEL 'NOM,. GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK § 2:77, at
171 (2006).
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NSMIA. 255 Section 18 provides that states may not directly or indirectly
require registration of offerings involving "covered securities, " 254 thus
preenipting state registration requirements for covered securities. 255
The definition of a covered security includes a security listed or author-
ized for listing on the NYSE, NASDAQ or the American Stock Ex-
change, 256 or sold pursuant to Rule 506 of Regulation D. 257 Section I8
also provides that "[a] security is a covered security with respect to the
offer or sale of the security to qualified purchasers, as defined by the
[SEC] by rule."258 Legislative history suggests any definition should "be
rooted in the belief that 'qualified' purchasers are sophisticated inves-
tors, capable of protecting themselves in a manner that renders regula-
tion by State authorities unnecessary." 259 Thus, the SEC could adopt a
rule including within the definition of "qualified purchaser" all offerees
and purchasers of securities pursuant to the proposed Section 5 ex-
emption because the exemption is limited to sophisticated investors.
This, in turn, would bring securities issued under the exemption within
the definition of a covered security, resulting in preemption of state
registration requirements. 26°
Notably, in December 2001, the SEC proposed a definition of
"qualified purchaser" for purposes of the definition of a "covered secu-
rity" under Section 18 of the Securities Act that mirrors the definition
of accredited investor under Regulation D. 261 The SEC reasoned that
the accredited investor concept is "based upon ... notions of the finan-
cial sophistication of investors" and "strikes the appropriate balance
between the necessity for investor protection and meaningful relief for
issuers offering securities." 262 To date, the SEC has not acted on' its pro-
posal.
As for implementing the Section 1 2(g) (1 ) exemption proposed
here, the SEC would have two choices. It could adopt the exemption
under Section 12(h) of the Exchange Act, which allows the SEC to ex-
255 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b).
254 Id.
255 Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption
Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 196-97 (1997).
256 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (1) (A); see also BLOOMENTHAI., supra note 34, § 10:21, at 579.
257 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (4) (D). Rule 506 was issued by the SEC under § 4(2) of the Secu-
rities Act,
255 Id. § 77r(b) (3).
255 H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 31 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3893.
255 See Campbell, supra note 255, at 207.
261 Definingthe Term "Qualified Purchaser" Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 8041, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,839 (proposed Dec. 27, 2001).
262 Id. at 66,840.
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empt by rule a class of issuers or securities from Section 12(g)'s regis-
tration requirement if it "fords, by reason of the number of public in-
vestors ... that such action is not inconsistent with the public interest
or the protection of investors." 265 Although not defined in the Ex-
change Act, the legislative history of Section 12(h) indicates that the
phrase "public investors" refers to investors who cannot "fend for them-
selves," as expressed in Ralston. Purina. 264
Because the proposed exemption is available only to an issuer with
100 or fewer unsophisticated shareholders, the issuer would have at
most 100 "public investors." In recommending the scope of Section
12(g) (1) to Congress, the SEC recognized that the record holder cutoff
had to be set at a level that was "manageable from the regulatory
standpoint and not disproportionately burdensome on issuers in rela-
tion to the national public interest to be served." 265 Hence, it advocated
a cutoff of 300 shareholders of record, and Congress ultimately settled
on 500. 266 Thus, under current law a company could conceivably have
499 unsophisticated shareholders and not be subject to Exchange Act
reporting and other requirements. 267 This obviously was not viewed as
inconsistent with the public interest, and, therefore, neither should the
proposed exemption because it sets the cutoff at a lower level.
To be sure, both sophisticated and unsophisticated shareholders
are counted toward the 499 record holder cap, but the proposed Sec-
tion 12(g) (1) exemption has no cap on the number of sophisticated
shareholders. 268 The concept of not counting the sophisticated toward
a cap, however, is not unique to this proposal. Both Rules 505 and 506
of Regulation D under the Securities Act cap the number of investors
in an offering relying on the rule at thirty-five but do not count accred-
ited investors toward the cap. 269
Alternatively, the SEC could adopt the proposed Section 12(g) (1)
exemption under Section 36 of the Exchange Act. 2" Section 36 . was
263 15 U.S.C. § 781(h).
264 See H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 3, at 17 (1963) (citing Ralston Purina and equating
"public" with investors that "need the protection of disclosure").
265 Id.
266 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1).
267 See id.
268 See infra app. at 683 (proposing a new § 240.12g-I).
269 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (1) (iv) (specifying that accredited investors are not in-
cluded for purposes of calculating the number of purchasers under Rules 505 or 506); see
also supra notes 114-122 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 505); supra notes 97-112
and accompanying text (discussing Rule 506).
270 15 U.S.C. § 78mm.
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added to the Exchange Act by NSMIA and, like Section 28 under the
Securities Act, provides the SEC with the power to exempt any class of
securities or persons from any provision of the Exchange Act "to the
extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors." 271 Addition-
ally, as was the case with the Securities Act, NSMIA also amended the
Exchange Act to require the SEC to consider capital formation in addi-
tion to investor protection when determining whether a new rule is in
the public interest. 272 Hence, the same arguments for why the Securi-
ties Act portions of this proposal meet the standard of Securities Act
Section 28 may also be advanced for why the Exchange Act portion of
this proposal meets the standard of Exchange Act Section 36.
It may strike some as ironic that this proposal is targeted at foster-
ing a quasi-public market whose listed companies are not subject to Ex-
change Act reporting and other requirements given the history of Sec-
tion 12(g) of the Exchange Act. Section 12(g) was added to the Ex-
change Act by Congress in 1964. 273 Its purpose was "[do extend to
investors in certain over-the-counter securities the same protection now
afforded to those in listed securities by providing that the issuers of cer-
tain securities now traded over the counter shall be subject to the same
requirements that now apply to issuers of securities listed on an ex-
change." 274 As the legislative history indicates, however, Section 12(g)
was directed at protecting the public investor275—the unsophisti-
cated. 276 An exemption from 12(g) directed to spurring the develop-
ment of an SIO market is not inconsistent with protecting the unsophis-
ticated.
271 Id.
272 See id. § 78c(f).
2" See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565,
566-68 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781).
274 H.R. REP. No. 88-1418, at 1 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3027.
275 See H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, pt. 3, at 18 (referring to "public-investor interest"); id. pt. 3,
at 33 (referring to public shareholders); see also Exemption of Compensatory Employee
Stock Options from Registration Under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Exchange Act Release No. 56,010, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,608, 37,609 (proposed July 10, 2007)
("The Commission has noted that the registration requirement of Section l2(g) was aimed at
issuers that had 'sufficiently active trading markets and public interest and consequently were
in need of mandatory disclosure to ensure the protection of investors.'" (emphasis added)).
276 See supra notes 224-225 and accompanying text.
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iv. THE AFTERMATH
A. New Markets
If the proposal advanced in this Article is put into effect, the NYSE ,
and NASDAQ likely would launch SIO markets in an effort to gain (or
not lose) listings. 277 This would be consistent with their approach of
offering multiple markets with varying listing standards in order to
maximize listings. 278
The London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market
("AIM") provides an example of what a new U.S. market could look
like. AIM is structured in such a way that its companies can avoid com-
plying with various U.K. and European securities regulations, including
the U.K. Combined Code on Corporate Governance and the European
Prospectus Directive. 278 This allows AIM to provide its listed companies
with "a simplified regulatory environment." 28° The hallmark of AIM is
its lighter listing and ongoing disclosure requirements. For example,
unlike the NYSE and NASDAQ, AIM has no minimum public float or
market capitalization requirement. 281 Further, AIM companies are re-
quired to prepare only semi-annual reports, not the quarterly reports
required for companies with securities registered under the Exchange
Act. 282 As a counterbalance to these reduced requirements, a company
must have a Nominated Advisor ("Nomad") in order to list on AIM. 288
Nomads include accounting firms and investment banks, and they must
277 For example, the NYSE currently operates the NYSE, N1SE Arca, NYSE Euronext, and
NYSE Alternext. See N.Y. Stock Exch., Listing Services, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/
1170350259553.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). Likewise, NASDAQ currently operates the
NASDAQ Capital Market, NASDAQ Global Market, and NASDAQ Global Select Market. See
NASDAQ Inc., NASDAQ GLOBAL SELECT MARKET 1 (2006), available at hup://www.nasdaq.
com/newsroom/presskit/reports/NASDAQ_Global_Select_Fact  sheet.pdf.
278 See NASDAQ Inc.. supra note 277, at 1; N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 277.
279 See Mendoza, supra note 169, at 296.
28° LONDON STOCK EXCH., A PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK: JOINING AIM 3 (2005) (listing
admissions criteria), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/
2FFDF9AD-2A8A-4EE6•B094-0A505E922F9A/0/1-SEADAGu idenogra ph icsFINAL. pdf.
281 London Stock Exch., AIM: Admission Criteria & Process, http://www.londonstock
exchange.com/en-gb/ prod tic ts/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_n ew/About+AIM/ad-
missioncritera.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009); see also OXFORD ANALYTICA, ASSESSMENT OF
'111E ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR A PAN-EUROPEAN GROWTH MARKET 15
(2005), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/63211361F-13501-
4CFD-BE57-148CB10F5E5E/0/ALMStudyfInal.pdf ("AIM sets no formal admission criteria
with respect to factors such as company size, track record, or free float.").
282 See Mendoza, supra note 169, at 311.
283 See LONDON STOCK EXCli„ supra note 280, at 19.
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be approved by the London Stock Exchange. 284 A Nomad determines a
company's suitability for listing on AIM, manages the offering process,
and advises the company on regulatory matters. 285 The idea is that re-
putational concerns will incentivize Nomads to perform these roles
diligently. 286
 The AIM model has proved quite successful. Since its in-
ception in 1995, over 2900 companies have listed on AIM, and it cur-
rently has over 1500 listed companies. 287
Although an AIM-type market could perhaps be partially repli-
cated in the United States through reliance on Rule 14-4A, this Article's
proposal would provide greater flexibility. 288 The market could be de-
signed without concern for the prohibition on general solicitation or
the 500 record holder trigger.
An AIM-type model represents just one possibility for an SIO mar-
ket. For example, the exchanges could also tailor an SIO market to at-
tract foreign listings. Numerous foreign companies have cross-listed
shares on U.S. exchanges purportedly to "bond" their disclosures to the
global market by voluntarily subjecting themselves to the stricter U.S.
regulatory regime. 289 By doing so, they attain a valuation premium on
their equity and, therefore, a lower cost of capital. 29° Cross-listings,
however, have declined post-SOX, and some have attributed this de-
cline to overregulation. 291 Hence, there could be demand for an SIO
market with stringent listing standards designed to provide a cheaper
bonding mechanism to foreign companies. 292
281 See id.
285 See id. at 19-20.
285 See Mendoza, supra note 169, at 295.
287 See London Stock Exch., AIM, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en.gb/products/
coinpanyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
288 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008). Pink Sheets LLC, an operator of an electronic quota-
tion service named the Pink Sheets, has launched a new trading designation called OTCQX
that includes a Nomad-type concept. See Kevin M. LaCroix, The Pink Sheets Take Aim at AIM,
1/8.:0 MARY, Mar. 6, 2007, http://dandodiary.blogspoicom/2007/03/pink-sheets-takes-
aim.hunl . OTCQX, however, is not exactly comparable to AIM because OTCQX companies
are generally subject to the provisions of the Exchange Act to the same extent as any other
public company.
288 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 229, 284-92 (2007) (describing the bonding hypothesis).
288 See id. at 236.
291 See id. at 235.
282 See id. If one accepts Coffee's view that enforcement intensity is the key to the bond-
ing premium, it is unclear whether an SIO market could serve as a bonding mechanism.
See id. at 242. A company listing on the SIO market would not be subject to many—but
would be subject to some—of the liability provisions of federal securities laws, and thus
there would be less ammunition for enforcement.
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In any case, a market could ensure that all of its buyers are sophis-
ticated by requiring them to certify as such as a condition to accessing
the market. This approach is used by NASDAQ for its QIB-only POR-
TAL market and has been endorsed by the SEC: 293 Limiting buy-side
access to sophisticated investors would allow an investor to resell securi-
des issued under the new Section 5 exemption without having to incur
any costs to verify that the counterparty to the trade is a sophisticated
investor.
B. Filling the Regulatory Void
As discussed above, a company with shares listed on an SIO market
would not be required to register the shares under the Exchange Act so
long as the company had 100 or fewer non-sophisticated sharehold-
ers. 294 Hence, the company would fall within a regulatory void because
it would not be subject to the mandatory disclosure requirements or
proxy regulations of the Exchange Act. This raises the question of who,
if anyone, would fill the void.
The most likely candidate would be the SIO markets themselves.
These markets would have strong financial incentives to compete • for
listings and trading volume. As a result, they would need to impose suf-
ficient regulation through listing standards so that investors would have
the confidence to buy and sell the securities listed on the markets. 295
Without investors, there would be no trading volume, and without trad-
ing there would be no listings.
Currently, both the NYSE and NASDAQ impose a host of listing
standards on companies that list on their various markets. For example,
both the NYSE and NASDAQ require a listed company to timely dis-
close material information, 296 make available to shareholders an annual
295 Order Approving NASDAQ Proposed Rule Change Relating to Reestablishment of
the PORTAL Market, Exchange Act Release No. 56,172, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,196, 44,199 (Aug.
7, 2007) (noting that the fact that NASDAQ limits access to PORTAL to QIBs is a sufficient
basis for a reseller through PORTAL to establish a reasonable belief, as required by Rule
144A, that a prospective purchaser is a QM). For a discussion of PORTAL, see generally
Sjostrom, supra note 182.
294 See supra notes 218-223 and accompanying text.
295 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. Rev. 1453, 1458 (1997)
("[Ain exchange will survive only if a sufficient number of investors find it worthwhile to
use the exchange's facilities to purchase the securities listed on the exchange.").
295 See NASD, NASD MANUAL § 4310(c) (16), http://cchwallstreet.com/nasclinaschiewer.
aspnelectedNode=3&FileName=/nasd/naskrules/RulesoftheAssociation_mg.xnal (last
visited Mar. 5, 2009) ("Except in unusual circumstances, [a NASDAQIisted] issuer shall make
prompt disclosure to the public through any Regulation FD compliant method (or combina-
tion of methods) of disclosure of any material information that would reasonably be ex-
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report that includes audited financial statements, 297 hold annual share-
holders' meetings, and solicit proxies for such meetings. 298 They also
impose various corporate governance standards including require-
ments with respect to independent directors, audit and nominating
committees, and shareholder voting. 299 These were put in place against
the backdrop of federal securities laws but provide an example of the
types of listing standards an SIO market may put in place.
Leaving the SIO markets to fill the regulatory void would intro-
duce market competition to disclosure and proxy regulation. This is
desirable because, as Roberta Romano has explained, "no government
entity can know better than market participants what regulations are in
their interest Competing regulators would make fewer policy mis-
takes than a monopolistic regulator as competition harnesses the in-
centives of the market to regulatory institutions." 300 Hence, this Arti-
cle's proposal may result in the additional benefit of better regulations
than those produced by the SEC—regulation that could serve as a
model for future SEC initiatives concerning public companies.
A common concern regarding the regulatory competition model
is that it may lead to a "race to the bottom" where competitors are
driven to supply rules that benefit managers at the expense of inves-
tors."' Certainly, SIO markets would have to cater to management be-
cause management makes the listing decision." 2 This, however, does
not mean SIO market competition would lead to a race to the bottom.
pected to affect the value of its securities or influence investors' decisions."); NISE, Inc.,
Listed Company Manual § 202.05 (2006), http://www.nyse.com/lcm/lcm_manual.shunl  ("A
listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or information which
might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its securities."). In July 2007,
the NASD and the member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration functions of the New
York Stock Exchange were consolidated into the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
("FINRA"). FINRA is in the process of consolidating NASD and N1SE rules into a single set
of FINRA rules but has not yet completed the process. See Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.,
FINRA Rules, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/F1NRARules/index.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 31, 2009).
297 NASD, supra note 296, § 4350(6); NI'SE, Inc., supra note 296, § 203.01.
298 NASD, supra note 296, § 4350(g); NYSE, Inc., supra note 296, §§ 401.00, 402.00.
269 Sec N1'SE, Inc., supra note 296, § 301.00.
3°° See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L J. 2359, 2365-66 (1998).
301 Sce Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits or: State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444-48 (1992). For example, corpo-
rate scholars have vigorously debated whether state competition for incorporations leads
to a "race to the top' or a "race to the bottom" with respect to state corporate law. See id.
(providing an overview of the debate).
3°2 See Robert A. Prentice, Regulatory Competition in Securities Law: A Dream (That Should
Be) Deferred, 66 Onto Si. L J. 1155, 1185 (2005).
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The more likely outcome, given financial incentives, is that the markets
would be driven to strike an optimal balance (in terms of maximizing
trading volume and listings) between investor welfare and management
accommodation. At the same time, SIO markets would have to be
mindful of possible SEC intervention if the balance leans too far toward
management accommodation. 303 Because this proposal would be im-
plemented largely through SEC-adopted exemptions, the SEC could
easily add mandatory disclosure obligations as a requirement of one
the exemptions. 304
The fact that the SEC could intervene is an important considera-
tion as recent events have demonstrated that sophisticated investors are
not immune from making terrible investment decisions. 305 The idea
behind distinguishing between sophisticated and unsophisticated inves-
tors, however, is not that sophisticated investors never make bad in
vestment decisions, but that they have the tools to evaluate an invest-
ment and, therefore, require considerably fewer legal safeguards. If,
however, bad decision making by sophisticated investors poses systemic
risk, additional regulation may be justified, not specifically to protect
the sophisticated but to protect the markets and economy generally.
Because I do not believe an SIO market poses systemic risk of. any con-
sequence, my preference would be to leave regulation of SIO compa-
nies and markets largely to the markets themselves. There is, however,
no reason that this would have to be the case. If the proposal made
here raises systemic risk issues, the SEC could adopt rule changes along
the lines sketched above but impose some level of regulation to address
these issues.
50 As Mark Roe has argued in the context of state competition for incorporations,
°Delaware's chief competitive pressure comes not from other states but from the federal
government. When the issue is big, the federal government takes control of it or threatens
to do so, or Delaware players are conscious that the federal government, even if silent,
could step in if roused." Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 linty. L. Rxv. 588, 590
(2003).
s°4 Several existing exemptions do require disclosure as a condition. For example.
both Rules 505 and 506 under the Securities Act require an issuer to make certain speci-
fied disclosures to non-accredited investors. See supra notes 97-122 and accompanying text.
"5 See, e.g., Katharina Bart & Ragnhild Kjetland, Crisis on Wall Street: Credit Suisse Logs
Big Loss, Dims View—Effort to Rein in Risk Will Be Ramped Up as Bank Moves to Smooth Volatil-
ity, WALL ST. J., Oct, 24, 2008, at C3 (noting that Credit Suisse lost billions of dollars on
mortgage securities and buyout loans); Randall Smith & Jed Horowitz, Merrill Takes $8.4
Billion Credit Hit-074'eal Faces Grilling as Loss Tops Forecast; Stock Price Falls 5.8%, WALI. ST.
J., Oct. 25, 2007, at Al (noting that Merrill Lynch lost billions of dollars on mortgage-
backed securities).
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A less likely candidate for filling the regulatory void would be the
states. Although this Article's proposal preempts state registration re-
quirements with respect to SIO company offerings, it has no effect on
state corporate law. State corporate law currently imposes minimal re-
quirements concerning disclosure and proxy solicitation because fed-
eral law occupies the field. 3" This, however, would no longer be the
case for the SIO segment of the market, thereby potentially exposing
SIO company disclosure and proxy solicitation rules to corporate fed-
eralism."7
Under the theory of corporate federalism, competition among
states for corporate charters leads to the production of corporate codes
that generally maximize shareholder value." 8 Managers are free to in-
corporate a business in any state, regardless of where the firm's opera-
tions are located. Hence, they will choose the jurisdiction that maxi-
mizes the joint welfare of management and investors because this will
result in the lowest cost of capita1. 3" Because incorporations generate
revenues for the state and work for local attorneys, states compete with
one other in attracting incorporations and, therefore, will generally
seek to produce corporate codes that maximize shareholder value. 310
Not knowing what in fact is the best mix of corporate law provisions,
states experiment with different rules, and the market determines the
winner. 311 Over time the "losing" states adopt similar rules in response,
"6 A prominent exception is Delaware common law, which does impose a duty of dis-
closure on Delaware corporations. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346,
356-63 (Del. Ch. 2008) (providing an overview of and applying the duty).
307 Professor Romano has previously argued that the corporate federalism model
should be extended to securities regulation. See generally Romano, supra note 300. To
achieve this, she calls for changes to current law to allow a corporation to opt out of fed-
eral securities laws coverage and instead be regulated by the securities laws of its selected
domicile. See id. at 2365. This, in theory, would spur states to attempt to attract additional
incorporations by offering desirable securities regulation regimes. See id. at 2388. Competi-
tion concerning regimes is desirable "because when the choice of investments includes
variation in legal regimes, promoters of firms will find that they can obtain a lower cost of
capital by choosing the regime that investors prefer." Id. at 2366. Hence, states would be
incentivized to "produce rules more aligned with the preferences of investors, whose deci-
sions drive the capital market." Id. at 2362.
262 See id. at 2365-66; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. Ftsclin., Tut Eco-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 218 (1991).
"9 See EASTERBROOR & FISCIIEL, supm note 308, at 213.
21° See id. at 212.
2 " See id. at 218.
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and the preferred solution eventually predominates." The end result
is typically policy innovation and better rules. 3 t 3
Competition among fifty states is more desirable than competition
among a handful of SIO markets because the more competitors, the
more experimentation, and therefore the greater likelihood of yielding
optimal rules. 314 Unfortunately, it is unlikely that states would actually
compete concerning SIO company securities regulations if given the
chalice. Because Delaware long ago established itself as the runaway
winner of the competition, 315 states likely view Delaware's lead as in-
surmountable and, therefore, conclude that competing is pointless." 6 .
There is no reason to believe that states would suddenly start compet-
ing simply because securities laws are added to the mix. 317
CONCLUSION
The success of AIM and the recent increase in the number of
companies that have exited or passed on our public markets under-
score the need for a new path to equity capital and share liquidity. The
proposal in this Article seeks to fill this need by exempting SIO compa-
3" See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5 (1993) [here-
inafter Roma:go, GENtus]; Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant
for Corporate Governance? 10 (Vale Univ., Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 05-02, 2005),
[hereinafter Romano, Competition) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=693484.
3" See ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 312, at 5; Romano, Competition, supra note 312, at
10.
314 See EASTERBROOK & FISCIIEL, supra note 308, at 216 (noting that even fifty competi-
tors is likely insufficient to yield optimal laws).
3" See id.; see also Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 701-24 (2002).
316 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsid-
ering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L. 553, 597 (2002) ("[Edarriers to
entry, network effects, large sunk costs, managerial control over reincorporation decisions,
and risk of strategic response by Delaware will deter rival states from mounting a meaning-
ful challenge to Delaware in the ordinary course of events.").
317 See Prentice, supra note 302, at 1175-76. As Professor Prentice explains:
If state competition for corporate charters via corporate regulation is
largely a myth, then state competition for securities law is likely to be equally
fanciful. State legislatures have long been the dominant players in corporate
law, yet they do not meaningfully compete there. How much less likely is it
that they will compete in the realm of securities regulation where they have
less experience and interest, where they have been only marginal players for
at least seventy years, and where there is no obvious motive to induce foreign
corporations to choose their body of securities law? Why, pray tell, would
Texas, for example, desire that a California corporation choose Texas law to
govern transactions in its securities?
Id.
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nies from many of the federal securities laws. Consequently, the pro-
posal would unleash the creativity and judgment of the marketplace in
establishing SIO markets and determining disclosure and other obliga-
dons.
Undoubtedly, there is risk involved in this approach. The funda-
mental purpose of the federal securities laws is to protect investors, and
this proposal puts the bulk of the protections aside. Hence, SIO mar-
kets could end up primarily attracting companies that want to preserve
the private benefits of control that they would lose by going public.
Consequently, there would likely be increased risk associated with in-
vesting in SIO companies. Sophisticated investors, however, are better
able to appreciate and bear risk than the general public. As the Su-
preme Court has stated, they can "fend for themselves." In the end, the
reforms proposed here would enhance capital formation by reducing
regulatory burdens without sacrificing investor protection and, there-
fore, should be adopted.
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APPENDIX
TEXT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
NEW Sul-lox 5 EXEMPTION (to be added to Regulation D of the Secu-
rities Act):
§ 230.508 Exemption for offers and sales to accredited investors only.
(a) Exemption. Offers and sales of securities that satisfy the condi-
tions in paragraph (c) of this section by an issuer shall be exempt from
the provisions of section 5 of the Act under section 28 of the Act.
(b) Issuer eligible to use this section. This section is available to any
issuer that is not subject to the reporting requirements of section 13 or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and is not an investment
company registered or required to be registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940.
(c) Conditions to be met.
(1) General conditions. To qualify, for an exemption under this sec-
tion, offers and sales must satisfy all the terms and conditions of
§§ 230.501 and 230.502(a), (c), and (e) to the extent not superseded
by paragraph (c) (2) (ii) of this section.
(2) Specific Conditions.
(i) Limitation on purchasers. All purchasers are or the issuer rea-
sonably believes that all purchasers are accredited investors.
(ii) General Solicitation and Advertising. Notwithstanding § 230.502(c),
a broker-dealer acting on the issuer's behalf may solicit offers and sales of
securities through oral or written communications constituting general
solicitation and general advertising so long as (1) any such oral commu-
nication is directed only at persons the broker-dealer reasonable believes
are accredited investors, (2) any such written communication promi-
nently states that sales will be made to accredited investors only, no
money or other consideration is being solicited or will be accepted
through the written communication, the securities have not been regis-
tered with or approved by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
and are being offered and sold pursuant to an exemption from registra-
tion, and the name and address of the broker-dealer making the solicita-
tion, and (3) such broker-dealer is registered with the Commission and
each state in which the solicitation or advertising is directed.
(iii) Limitations on resale. Securities acquired in a transaction made
pursuant to the provisions of this section are deemed to be restricted
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securities within the meaning of Rule 144(a) (3). The issuer must pro-
vide written disclosure to each purchaser prior to sale that the securities
have not been registered under the Act and, therefore, cannot be re-
sold unless they are registered under the Act or unless an exemption
from registration is available.
RULE 144 AMENDMENTS:
§ 230.144 Persons deemed not to be engaged in a distribution and
therefore not underwriters.
(b) * * *
(iii) If the issuer of the securities is not, or has not been for a pe-
riod of at least 90 days immediately before the sale, subject to the re-
porting requirements of section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, and
the securities were issued by the issuer under § 230.508, any person
who is not an affiliate of the issuer at the time of the sale, and has not
been an affiliate during the preceding three months, who sells re-
stricted securities of the issuer for his or her own account shall be
deemed not to be an underwriter of those securities within the mean-
ing of section 2(a) (11) of the Act if the condition of paragraph (d) of
this section is met.
(d) * * *
* * *
(iii) If the issuer of the securities is not, or has not been for a pe-
riod of at least 90 days immediately before the sale, subject to the re-
porting requirements of section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, and
the securities were issued by the issuer under Rule 508 of the Act, the
securities may be immediately offered and resold to any person who is
an accredited investor or whom the seller reasonably believes is an ac-
credited investor,
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PREEMPTION:
§ 230.146 Rules under section 18 of the Act.
*****
(c) Definition of Qualified Purchase?: A "qualified purchaser" as used
in Section 18(b) (3) of the Act means any person who is offered or sold
securities by an issuer in reliance on §230.508.
EXCHANGE ACT § 12 (g) EXEMPTION:
§240.12g-1 Exemptions From Section 12(g).
(b) An issuer shall be exempt from the requirement to register a
class of equity securities pursuant to section 12(g) (1) if there are 100 or
fewer or the issuer reasonably believes there are 100 or fewer beneficial
owners of such equity securities who were not accredited investors (as
defined in § 230.501(a) of the Securities Act) on the date they acquired
such equity securities.
